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Abstract
Recent scholarship and commentaries on populism and international law 
often focus on the rise of  right-wing populist regimes in contemporary po-
litics. This paper invites a shift of  attention to populism in the (semi)colo-
nies in the process of  national liberation and anticolonialism, in order to 
achieve a more historically and socially informed understanding about the 
relationship between populism and international law. The paper chooses the 
populist movements in China against extraterritoriality and imperialism in 
the 1920s. I will ask what particular frustrations and ideologies motivated 
the populist movements in the 1920s. Drawing on Laclau’s theory, I will 
analyse why and how exactly these movements were populist. In addition, 
the direct and indirect consequences of  the Chinese populism will be exa-
mined to understand its ramifications not only on the revision of  unequal 
treaties and the dismantling of  extraterritoriality, but more broadly on the 
development of  international law. Using this historical episode, the paper hi-
ghlights populism’s emancipatory potential of  mobilising resistance against 
repression and correcting systemic injustice, as well as the intrinsic ambiva-
lence of  such potential.
Keywords: Populism, anti-imperialism, nationalism, extraterritoriality, tre-
aty revision
Resumo
Estudos e comentários recentes sobre populismo e direito internacional fo-
calizaram na ascensão de regimes populistas de direita na política contem-
porânea. Este artigo convida a uma mudança de atenção para o populismo 
nas (semi) colônias no processo de libertação nacional e anticolonialismo, a 
fim de alcançar uma compreensão mais histórica e socialmente informada 
sobre a relação entre populismo e direito internacional. O artigo escolhe os 
movimentos populistas na China contra a extraterritorialidade e o imperiali-
smo na década de 1920 problematizando como as frustrações e as ideologias 
específicas motivaram os movimentos populistas na década de 1920. Com 
base na teoria de Laclau, analisarei por que e como exatamente esses mo-
vimentos eram populistas. Além disso, as consequências diretas e indiretas 
do populismo chinês serão examinadas para entender suas ramificações não 
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apenas na revisão de tratados desiguais e no desmante-
lamento da extraterritorialidade, mas de forma mais am-
pla no desenvolvimento do direito internacional. Usan-
do esse episódio histórico, o artigo destaca o potencial 
emancipatório do populismo de mobilizar a resistência 
contra a repressão e corrigir a injustiça sistêmica, bem 
como a ambivalência intrínseca de tal potencial
Palavras-chave: Populismo. Anti-imperialismo. 
Nacionalismo. Extraterritorialidade. Revisão de 
tratado.
1 Introduction
The emergence of  populist governments in various 
parts of  the world in recent years has led to renewed 
interest in studying “populism”, the causes of  populism 
and how it should be responded. Located in the con-
juncture of  the rise of  populist governments and various 
forms of  “crisis” of  the model of  liberal democracy,1 
the mainstream literature on populism has mainly paid 
attention to the right-wing populism and often tends to 
merge populism with ethno-nationalism, isolationism 
and xenophobia, hence, making “populism” largely a 
pejorative term.2 Despite the relatively common ack-
nowledgement that populism is easily attached to va-
riated ideologies,3 relatively less studies have been made 
to the cases where populism played a more progressive 
role throughout the 20th century.4 Even less attempt was 
1 DOYLE, O. et al. Populism: a health check for constitutional 
democracy? German Law Journal, v. 20, n. 401, 2019; WALKER, N. 
Populism and constitutional tension. International Journal of  Consti-
tutional Law, v. 17, n. 515, 2019.; KUO, M-S. Against Instantane-
ous Democracy. International Journal of  Constitutional Law, v. 17, n. 
554, 2019.\\uc0\\u8216{}Populism and Constitutional Tension\\
uc0\\u8217{} (2019
2 EATWELL, R.; GOODWIN, M. National populism: the revolt 
against liberal democracy. London: Penguin UK, 2018; BUGARIC, 
B. Central Europe’s descent into autocracy: a constitutional analysis 
of  authoritarian populism. International Journal of  Constitutional Law, 
v. 17, n. 2, p. 597-616, jul. 2019; SCHEPPELE, K. L. The opportun-
ism of  populists and the defense of  constitutional liberalism.  Ger-
man Law Journal, v. 20, n. 314, 2019.
3 MUDDE, C.; KALTWASSER, C. R. Populism: a very short intro-
duction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
4 HOWSE, R. Epilogue: in defense of  disruptive democracy: a 
critique of  anti-populism. International Journal of  Constitutional Law, 
v. 17, n. 641, 2019; MCKNIGHT, D. Populism Now!: the case for pro-
gressive populism paperback. Australian: University of  New South 
Wales Press, 2018; BUGARIC, B. The two faces of  populism: be-
tween authoritarian and democratic populism. German Law Journal, 
v. 20, n. 3, p. 390-400, abr. 2019.{\\i{}Populism Now!} (ReadHow-
devoted to reclaiming and taking “populism” back from 
the right-wingers and to reutilising it for correcting the 
structur0al deficits of  liberal democracy.5 This tendency 
of  considering populism as mainly right-wing can also 
be found in the scholarship of  international law, which 
often associates populism with the backlashes against 
multilateralism and international cooperation and sees 
populism as threatening and undermining the liberal in-
ternational legal order.6 
YouWant.com, Limited 2018
5 MOUFFE, C. For a Left Populism. Rio de Janeiro: Verso Books, 
2018; MCKNIGHT, D. Populism Now!: the case for progressive pop-
ulism paperback. Australian: University of  New South Wales Press, 
2018.\” a left-populist strategy could bring together the manifold 
struggles against subordination, oppression and discrimination. This 
strategy acknowledges that democratic discourse plays a crucial role 
in the political imaginary of  our societies. And through the construc-
tion of  a collective will, mobilizing common affects in defence of  
equality and social justice, it will be possible to combat the xenopho-
bic policies promoted by right-wing populism. In redrawing politi-
cal frontiers, this \”populist moment\” points to a \”return of  the 
political\” after years of  postpolitics. A return may open the way for 
authoritarian solutions--through regimes that weaken liberal-demo-
cratic institutions--but it could also lead to a reaffirmation and exten-
sion of  democratic values”,”ISBN”:”978-1-78663-755-0”,”language
”:”en”,”note”:”Google-Books-ID: ccNfDwAAQBAJ”,”number-
of-pages”:”113”,”publisher”:”Verso Books”,”source”:”Google 





Populism can be a dirty word. Brexit and the election of  Donald 
Trump have certainly given it a bad name. But rather than associat-
ing it with demagoguery and exclusion, might we better see it as a 
backlash against free market globalisation? Might it be harnessed 
as a positive force able to thrive in difficult times? This timely and 
persuasive book exposes the failures of  globalisation: greedy banks, 
predatory privatisation, corporate tax avoidance and a growing un-
derclass of  temporary overseas workers. David McKnight argues 
that a progressive populism could address the genuine economic 
grievances of  everyday people, without scapegoating immigrants or 
ethnic minorities. In fact, a progressive form of  populism may be 
the best way of  defeating the racist backlash of  right-wing pop-
ulism. It may also be the best way to save the planet. In a world 
where the super-rich get richer, one that is charged with hate-filled 
language as people look for someone else to blame, the case for 








6 POSNER, E. A. Liberal Internationalism and the Populist 
Backlash.  Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, v. 66, 2017.; 
KRIEGER, H. Populist Governments and International Law. Eu-









































































The mainstream treatment of  “populism” is criti-
qued by Schwöbel-Patel as very much Western-centric 
and ahistorical.7 To rethink populism and to revive its 
progressive potential to correct the deficits of  the libe-
ral international legal order require the broadening of  
theoretical horizons and invite new engagements with 
history. The critique of  Western-centrism raises impor-
tant questions about the experiences of  populism in 
the Third-World countries and the influences of  those 
experiences on their perceptions and practices of  in-
ternational law. Countries of  the Global South, being 
the late comers to the club of  the “civilized nations”, 
have made crucial efforts (such as the New Internatio-
nal Economic Order8 and the Bandung Declaration9) 
to call up international solidarity and redistribute poli-
tical and economic powers to make international legal 
order more just, fair and inclusive. So far, studies on 
Third World populism have been focusing on the pos-
tcolonial era and, in particular, the trials and errors of  
the populist leaders in Latin America.10 What is surpri-
singly less discussed in the current studies about popu-
lism and international law is the populist movements in 
other colonies and semi-colonies before fully achieving 
sovereign independence. Often closely related to the 
movements of  national liberation and anti-imperialism, 
the experiences of  (semi)colonies had lasting impacts 
on the development of  international law and the stru-
ggles for global justice in the postcolonial era. Studying 
these movements, and in particular, their construction 
I. International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era. Texas Law Re-
view, v. 96, n. 279, 2017.; ROBERTS, A. Is International Law Inter-
national? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.; HOSTOVSKY 
BRANDES, T. International law in domestic courts in an era of  
populism. International Journal of  Constitutional Law, v. 17, n. 576, 
2019.\\uc0\\u8216{}Populist Governments and International 
Law\\uc0\\u8217{} (2019
7 SCHWÖBEL-PATEL, C. Populism, international law and the 
end of  keep calm and carry on lawyering. In: NIJMAN, J. E.; WER-
NER, W. G. (ed.). Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law 2018. Ber-
lin: TMC Asser Press, 2019. v. 49.
8 GILMAN, N. The new international economic order: a reintro-
duction. Humanity: An International Journal of  Human Rights, Humani-
tarianism, and Development, v. 6, n. 1, 2015.
9  ESLAVA, L. et al. Bandung, global history, and international law: criti-
cal pasts and pending futures. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017.
10 RODILES, A. Is There a “Populist” International Law (in 
Latin America)? In: NIJMAN, J. E.; WERNER, W. G. (ed.). Neth-
erlands Yearbook of  International Law 2018. Berlin: TMC Asser Press, 
2019. v. 49.; DE LA TORRE, C. Populism in Latin America. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Available in: https://www..
co /10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780198803560-e-8 Accessed on: 21 Feb. 2020.
of  “the people” and political frontiers, their naming of  
“the enemy”, and their imaginations about the world 
order would offer insights not only about the colonial 
shadow of  international law (which has been a signi-
ficant topic of  study in the recent international legal 
scholarship11), but more importantly – for the purpose 
of  better understanding populism and international law 
– how “the political logic” of  populism has influenced 
the modern international law.
This paper intervenes in the current studies on Third 
World populism and international law by looking into 
the populist movements in China in the 1920s and the 
ways in which they had contributed to the dismantling 
of  extraterritoriality in China. The 1920s was a unique 
decade for both China and international law. For inter-
national law, the decade following the First World War 
saw the Versailles-Washington international system, an 
ambitious but frail system comprising of  the “civilized 
states” who uneasily treated each other as equals and 
coordinated through the League of  Nations.12 The co-
11 BENTON, L. Made in empire: Finding the history of  interna-
tional law in imperial locations: introduction. Leiden Journal of  Inter-
national Law, v. 31, n. 3, p. 473-478, 2018; VON BERNSTORFF, J.; 
DANN, P. (ed.). The Battle for International Law: South-North perspec-
tives on the Decolonization Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019.; CHIMNI, B. S. Capitalism, imperialism, and international law 
in the twenty-first century. Oregon Review of  International Law, v. 14, n. 
17, 2012; ANGHIE, A. Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of  inter-
national law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
12  JOUANNET, E. The liberal-welfarist law of  nations: a history 
of  international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012; KINGSBURY, B. Sovereignty and inequality. European Jour-
nal of  International Law, v. 9, n. 599, 1998.international law has al-
ways been a welfarist law, too. Emerging in eighteenth-century 
Europe, it soon won favour globally. Not only did it minister to 
the interests of  states and their concern for stability, but it was 
also an interventionist law designed to ensure the happiness and 
well-being of  peoples. Hence international law initially served as a 
secularised eschatological model, replacing the role of  religion in 
ensuring the proper ordering of  mankind, which was held to be 
both one and divided. That initial vision still drives our post-Cold 
War globalised world. Contemporary international law is neither a 
strictly welfarist law nor a strictly liberal law, but is in fact a liberal-
welfarist law. In the conjunction of  these two purposes lies one of  
the keys to its meaning and a partial explanation for its continuing 
ambivalence.”,”ISBN”:”978-1-107-37953-4”,”language”:”en”,”not
e”:”Google-Books-ID: 0EMhAwAAQBAJ”,”number-of-pages”:”
327”,”publisher”:”Cambridge University Press”,”source”:”Google 
Books”,”title”:”The Liberal-Welfarist Law of  Nations: A History 














































































loniality of  international law was still maintained by the 
Western “great powers”, and nevertheless, was challen-
ged by two powerful and completely different world 
views and ideologies: the vision of  a liberal world order 
offered by Woodrow Wilson on the one hand, and the 
vision of  proletarian international revolution started 
from Russia on the other hand. Both world views and 
ideologies inspired and mobilized the peoples in the 
(semi)colonies to demand national self-determination 
and independence. Waves of  mass political and military 
upheavals in the peripheries seemed to bring the old 
world of  imperial rule to the verge of  collapse. 
For China, characterized as “semi-colonial” and “se-
mi-feudal”,13 the Chinese society in the 1920s also saw 
various emancipatory ideas and practices of  different 
ideologies, such as socialism, communism, and libera-
lism, etc.  For a short period, these ideas and ideolo-
gies, despite their differences, coalesced around a com-
mon enemy, i.e., the imperialists. And one of  the major 
specific targets of  the anti-imperialist movements was 
the system of  extraterritoriality. The system of  extra-
territoriality, which originated from a series of  unequal 
treaties between China and the foreign powers since the 
mid-19th century, had already evolved into a full-fledged 
political-juridical system which suspended and displa-
ced the Chinese jurisdiction on China’s own territories. 
The most vivid objectification, and indeed the territo-
rialisation, of  such a political-juridical system of  foreign 
rule, was the establishment of  foreign concessions and 
settlements in treaty ports on the basis of  various kinds 
of  land lease agreements. From the mid-1840s to 1902, 
there were about 27 foreign concessions in China. Sig-
nifying the great violation of  China’s sovereignty, the 
system of  extraterritoriality, as objectified into the ex-
ceptional spaces of  concessions and settlements, was 
the prime objective of  China’s emancipation in the 
1920s.  






13 For example, Chen Duxiu, one of  the Chinese leading intellec-
tuals and the co-founder of  Chinese Communist Party, wrote that 
“the National Revolution has two meanings: national revolution and 
democratic revolution, namely, the overthrow of  foreign imperi-
alism and the native semi-feudal forces.” DUXIU apud HAN, X. 
Chinese Discourses on the Peasant, 1900-1949. New York: SUNY Press, 
2012.
China had been requesting the abolition of  extra-
territoriality since the late Qing dynasty. By the second 
half  of  the 1910s, as the treaty powers were fighting the 
First World War in Europe, which drastically changed 
the power dynamic in China, the demand of  abolishing 
extraterritoriality and fully recovering the sovereignty of  
China emerged from various parts of  the Chinese socie-
ty and became especially urgent. From the Paris Peace 
Conference to the Washington Conference, the Chine-
se delegations tried to put this demand on the agenda. 
Motivated by Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Chinese go-
vernment hoped to gather sympathies among the world 
leaders and persuade the treaty powers in bloc to re-
linquish extraterritoriality all together.14 This, however, 
was wishful thinking. The long list of  proposals made 
by the Chinese Delegation at the Paris Peace Conferen-
ce15 was largely put aside, as the Conference was mainly 
concerned about the postwar situation in Europe.16 The 
Chinese proposals were, however, included in the man-
dates of  the Washington Conference two years later. 
What resulted from the Washington Conference was at 
best a mixed blessing. The nine-power treaty established 
the principle of  cooperation in China, and the other 
eight powers (i.e., the US, the UK, France, Italy, Por-
tugal, Japan, Netherland and Belgium) were to respect 
China’s sovereignty, independence and integrity and to 
provide an environment for China to develop a stable 
government.17 However, in terms of  the abrogation of  
extraterritoriality, the Washington Conference did not 
achieve any concrete promises, but decided to establish 
a commission of  inquiry to study the practice of  ex-
traterritoriality in China and that the findings of  that 
commission would not be binding on the other eight 
powers at the Conference.18 There were, then, unpre-
14 YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 1918–20: the mid-
dle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1991.
15 The Chinese Memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Con-
ference includes these requests: the renunciation of  the spheres of  
influences in China, foreign troops and police, and foreign post 
offices, the relinquishment of  consular jurisdictions, leased territo-
ries and concessions and settlements, and the denunciation of  the 
conventional tariff. YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 
1918–20: the middle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 1991.
16 YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 1918–20: the mid-
dle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1991.
17 UNITED STATES. Conference on the Limitation of  Armament. 
Washington, 1921. Available in: https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-
war/1922/nav_lim.html Accessed on: 3 Mar. 2020.









































































cedented feelings of  injustice in China toward the ex-
traterritoriality system and international law. The origin 
of  the extraterritorial system – the unequal treaties that 
China signed after losing wars to the foreign powers – 
of  course, remained a major source of  the national grie-
vance. The grievance was, however, also exacerbated by 
the failure of  the high hope about the benevolence of  
the imperial powers and the Wilsonian world order. In-
ternational conferences offered no level playing fields 
for China, only a “probationary” member of  the Family 
of  Nations,19 to negotiate with the foreign powers. A 
different route to the dismantling of  extraterritoriality 
needed to be taken. 
The disappointment regarding the prospect of  
fully recovering China’s sovereignty through formal 
international participation had made the Chinese go-
vernment (the Beijing Government, which was, then, 
internationally recognized) change strategy. Instead of  
seeking the agreements of  all treaty powers in interna-
tional conferences, the Beijing Government started to 
approach each treaty power and to address the issue 
of  extraterritoriality through bilateral negotiations on 
treaty revision. This was made possible also by the fact 
that several treaties signed in the late 19th century were 
approaching to expiration,20 which made the legal bases 
of  the extraterritorial system uncertain. In addition, the 
Beijing Government also actively invoked the doctrine 
of  Rebus Sic Stantibus to seek treaty revisions.21 While the 
Beijing Government achieved some important progres-
ses through bilateral negotiations, it remained especially 
difficult to convince the United Kingdom, who had the 
largest interest in China, to abandon extraterritoriality 
and to hand over its concessions to China. The difficul-
ty was partly attributed to the civil war in China due to 
which the Beijing Government lost control over signi-
STATES. Conference on the Limitation of  Armament. Washington, 1921. 
Available in: https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/nav_lim.
html Accessed on: 3 Mar. 2020.  
19 YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 1918–20: the mid-
dle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1991.
20 Sino-Belgium Treaty of  November 2, 1865 expired on October 
27, 1926; the Sino-France Treaty of  April 25, 1886 expired on Au-
gust 7, 1926, the Sino-Japan Treaty of  July 21, 1896 expired on Oc-
tober 20, 1926, the Sino-Spain Treaty of  October 10, 1864 expired 
on May 10, 1927.
21 TSENG, Y-H. The termination of  unequal treaties in international 
law: studies in comparative jurisprudence and Conventional Law 
of  Nations. Pequin: The Commercial Press, Ltd, 1931. Available in: 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/trmunql0001&i=75 
Accessed on:  3 Mar. 2020.
ficant parts of  the Chinese territories. Taking advanta-
ge of  the situation of  the civil war, the British claimed 
that while it was prepared to have friendly negotiation 
with the Chinese government, such negotiation had to 
be done with a central government having the autho-
rity to represent the whole of  China.22 This attitude, 
understandably, was considered by the Chinese society 
as disingenuous and distrustful. The frustration of  the 
Chinese society was also redirected to the Beijing Go-
vernment who accepted the terms of  the Washington 
Conference and was attempting to negotiate with the 
UK. And the Beijing Government was criticized by the 
revolutionary parties as traitorous.23 Formal diploma-
tic process had, hence, reached a standstill. There was 
when the populist movements came in. 
In the 1920s, the populist movements in China were 
founded in several different ideologies and led by diffe-
rent political parties, while sharing the common target 
of  foreign imperialism, especially the British imperia-
lism. The Guomindang (hereinafter, the “KMT”), the 
nationalist party under the leadership of  Sun Yat-sen, 
established a regime in Guangzhou in 1923 and orga-
nized waves of  nationalist mass movements by mobi-
lizing young students and the petty bourgeoisies. The 
Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter, the “CPC”) was 
also growing rapidly by marshaling the urban proleta-
riats, such as industrial workers and coolies, and became 
an important political force. While against Bolshevism, 
Sun Yat-sen was inspired by the Russian Revolution and 
attracted by the influence of  the Communist Party, es-
pecially its appeal to the proletariat masses. He, hence, 
initiated the first alliance with the CPC in 1924. A large 
revolutionary force against the foreign imperialism was 
formed to amalgamate nationalist movements and la-
bour movements. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s analysis 
of  populism, I will explore the political logic of  popu-
lism in these mass movements: the construction of  a 
popular identity – “the people” – as fluid and internally 
split, the identification of  the “enemy”, the creation of  
a broad political frontier of  antagonism which unified 
specific and heterogenous social demands, and the in-
vestment of  affection and rhetoric in these movements. 
22 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
23 TANG, Q. Treaty revision campaign of  the Beijing Government, 1912-
1928: out of  the shadow of  the ‘Abrogation of  Unequal Treaties’. 









































































The paper will examine how the mass anti-imperia-
list movements in China provided leverage for China in 
the struggle of  abolishing extraterritoriality. In the next 
section, I will look into four specific movements during 
the period of  anti-foreign, and especially, anti-British 
imperialism. The first two cases concerned the mass 
strikes and anti-British boycotts in 1925 following the 
killings of  Chinese workers and protestors. The other 
two incidents were mass actions specifically targeting 
the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang in the 
early January of  1927. In discussing these four cases, I 
will explain the populist logic therein by drawing mainly 
from Laclau’s theory of  populism (Section 3). In Sec-
tion 4, these mass movements will be studied in terms 
of  their direct and indirect impacts on extraterritoria-
lity. Directly, the populist movements, especially in the 
treaty ports and foreign concessions, resisted against 
and challenged the rule of  foreign powers by way of  
open confrontation. Indirectly, those movements, by 
denouncing the Beijing Government and supporting 
the Nationalist Government, also changed the game of  
the negotiation on the treaty revision by the Beijing Go-
vernment. The anti-imperialist frontier created by the 
KMT – CPC alliance had its internal contradictions and 
conflicts, which had led to a tragic crackdown against 
the communists by General Jiang Jieshi (also spelt as 
Chiang Kai-shek) in April 1927. In examining the se-
lected cases of  mass movements and their impacts on 
extraterritoriality, the study will highlight the ambiva-
lence of  populism, its progressive and emancipatory 
potential, as well as the fragility of  its construction of  
“the people” and its political frontier. In studying this 
particular episode of  populist movements in China, this 
paper aims to contribute to a subtler and more histori-
cally and socially informed understanding of  populism 
and its relationship with international law. 
2  Populist anti-imperial movements 
in the 1920s China 
2.1  The emergence of the anti-imperialist 
political frontier  
Starting from the late 1910s, anti-imperialism beca-
me a common cause that united different sectors and 
classes in the Chinese society and gradually formed a 
broad political alliance. Following the failure of  the 
Chinese delegations at the Paris Peace Conference, on 
May 4 of  1919,24 a demonstration of  some three thou-
sand students took place in Beijing protesting against 
the Treaty of  Versailles, which transferred the German 
cession of  Jiaozhou and associated rights to Japan, and 
against Japan’s Twenty-One Demands. Initiated by the 
students in Beijing, the movement spread to other ma-
jor cities, such as Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuhan and Guan-
gzhou, and gathered huge support from urban workers. 
Combining patriotism, nationalism and anti-imperia-
lism, the protestors put forward the demands of  protec-
ting the sovereignty of  China, punishing the traitorous 
ministers of  the Beijing Government and refusing to 
sign the Treaty of  Versailles. The movement brought 
tremendous pressure on the Beijing Government who, 
eventually, did not sign the Treaty.25 
The May 4 Movement was the first time that stu-
dents and workers allied in the Chinese political stru-
ggles. It was also the first time that the workers, a still 
very young class in China, explicitly articulated their 
demands and became a powerful agent of  political stru-
ggle. Chinese workers employed in foreign factories 
had long been brutally abused and exploited by their 
employers. As documented by Chen Ta in a series of  
studies on the labour conditions in China in the 1920s, 
urban workers worked for between 12 to 16 hours a day 
for salaries too low to cover the rising living costs. In 
addition, workers were systematically subjected to racial 
discrimination and lacked basic guarantees for working 
safety and hygiene. Child labour was widely used from 
cotton mills to coalmines.26 The ideas of  sovereignty 
and democracy which the workers learned from their 
student comrades in the May 4 Movement soon spread 
among them and were more concretely translated into 
various demands about labour rights to improve their 
socioeconomic conditions. They soon formed unions 
and held waves of  strikes against the foreign exploiters 
in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Changsha and Shanghai. It 
was documented that, for example, from 1918 to 1926, 
24 YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 1918–20: the mid-
dle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1991.
25 YONGJIN, Z. China in the International System, 1918–20: the mid-
dle kingdom at the periphery. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1991.
26 CHEN, T. Labor Unrest in China. Monthly Labor Review, v. 13, 
n. 16, 1921; CHEN, T. Labor Conditions in China. Monthly Labor 









































































the average annual number of  recorded strikes was 
136.88, involving almost 180,000 people per year from 
various sorts of  industries.27   
It is worth emphasizing the unique anti-imperialist 
character of  the Chinese labour movement in the early 
1920s. The Chinese economy had long been dominated 
by the foreign capital, due to a set of  unequal treaties 
since the first Opium War. Massive amounts of  foreign 
capital were invested to build factories, shipyards, coal-
mines and railways in China and significantly squeezed 
the room of  development of  the Chinese native capi-
tal. Hence, the workers’ strikes, while making deman-
ds about the immediate improvement of  their labour 
conditions, had their foreign exploiters the prime tar-
get of  their movement. Due to the distorted structure 
of  the capitalist economy in China, i.e., the domination 
by the foreign capital and the exploitation of  the Chi-
nese labourers by the foreign enterprises, the workers’ 
movements not only addressed labour rights, but had a 
strong anti-imperialist tone. As Sun Yat-sen put it: “The 
difference between the Chinese workers and foreign 
workers lies in the fact that the latter are oppressed only 
by their own capitalists and not by those of  other coun-
tries …The Chinese workers are as yet not oppressed 
by Chinese capitalists … They are oppressed by foreign 
capitalists.”28 This difference, as pointed out by Sun, 
also made possible the formation of  alliance between 
the Chinese labourers and the nationalist bourgeoisies 
under the banner of  anti-imperialism.
The unique anti-imperialist character of  the Chine-
se labour movements made the workers a particular-
ly powerful political force in the struggles for China’s 
emancipation in the 1920s. While largest population of  
the oppressed masses in China was the peasants, the 
workers’ organizations were far more developed than 
those of  the peasants.29 The organization, concentra-
tion and determination of  the workers made them es-
pecially politically conscious and responsive to the mo-
vements of  other oppressed social groups which were 
devoted to the common cause of  anti-imperialism. Spe-
cific anti-imperialist sentiments also often culminated 
27 CHEN, T. Analysis of  Strikes in China, from 1918 to 1926. London: 
Nabu Press, 2010.
28 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009; YSUI, S-C. The Influence of  the Canton-Mos-
cow Entente upon Sun Yat-Sen’s Political Philosophy. Chinese Social 
and Political Science Review, v. 18, n. 96, 1934.
29 CHEN, T. Analysis of  Strikes in China, from 1918 to 1926. London: 
Nabu Press, 2010.
in sweeping strikes and boycotts, relayed by workers’ 
organizations from one city to another. The following 
subsections look into four incidents during this period 
of  mass movements which had significantly shaken the 
foreign, and especially, the British imperialism in China. 
2.2  “Down with Imperialism”: From May 30 in 
Shanghai to the General Guangdong – Hong 
Kong Strike 
The May 30 Incident was one of  the most impor-
tant incidents in the anti-imperialist movements of  the 
1920s. It had major ramifications on the subsequent 
British policy toward China and the destiny of  the ex-
traterritorial system. From February to April of  1925, 
workers in Japanese cotton mills in Shanghai had been 
on strike and demanding for wage increases. The Ja-
panese refused the demands, brutally beating the stri-
king workers and killing a workers’ representative, Gu, 
on May 15th.30 Over the rest month of  May, students 
and workers in Shanghai had been seeking justice for 
Gu. Meanwhile, in Qingdao, a brutal crackdown by the 
pro-Japanese Chinese officials on the striking workers 
against the abuse at the Japanese mills happened on May 
29th, leading to the deaths of  eight workers and more 
than 70 arrests.31 On May 30th, more than two thousand 
students joined by the workers in Shanghai took to the 
street, protesting against the shooting down in Qingdao 
and the murder of  Gu. Students delivered speeches and 
distributed the pamphlets in the train station and near 
the International Mixed Court in the Shanghai Inter-
national Settlement. When the protestors gathered in 
front of  a police station in the International Settlement, 
a British police officer ordered to open fire. As a result, 
thirteen protestors were killed.32 After the shooting, 
the Municipal Council of  the International Settlement 
immediately declared the state of  emergency. The Set-
tlement was heavily guarded by machine guns, canons, 
cavalry and firetrucks. The Volunteer Corps and landed 
British marines searched several universities in the con-
cession and dispelled students in the following days.33 
30 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1.
31 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1.
32 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1.
33 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 









































































The violent reaction of  the British authorities in 
the International Settlement inflamed the masses. On 
June 2nd, the Shanghai General Labour Union declared 
a general boycott, demanding the punishment of  the 
perpetrators and the compensation for the victims of  
the May 30 Incident, as well as the acknowledgement 
of  the workers’ right to form unions and the right to 
hold strikes.34 On June 7th, the Shanghai General La-
bour Union, the Shanghai Shopkeepers’ Federation, the 
Shanghai Students’ Federation, and the National Stu-
dents’ Federation formed a Committee of  the Shanghai 
Workers’, Merchants’, and Students’ Federation to or-
ganize and direct the strikes in Shanghai. The Commit-
tee came up with a 17-point program in response to 
the May 30 Incident. In addition to the demands about 
punishment and compensation, the program demanded 
measures to alter the situation of  the Shanghai Inter-
national Settlement, including the revocation of  the 
martial law, the withdrawal of  the British marines, the 
abolition of  the police station and the Volunteer Corps 
in the concession, and the release of  the arrested Chi-
nese protestors. The 17-point program also put forward 
further political demands on, inter alia, ensuring Chine-
se people’s rights to freedom of  speech, freedom of  
assembly and freedom of  the press in the concession, 
abolishing extraterritoriality (mainly referred to the con-
sular jurisdiction and the International Mixed Court), 
and returning the concession to Chinese administration 
upon the expiration of  relevant treaties.35 The strong 
political tone of  the demonstration in response to the 
May 30 Incident can be seen from a declaration made 
by the National Students’ Federation that, “the mur-
der and arrest of  students and workers, the oppression 
of  the freedom of  expression and the heavy taxation 
were caused by the unequal treaties and the system 
of  extraterritoriality.”36 Following the direction of  the 
Committee and the 17-point program, a mass demons-
tration involving almost 200,000 people was held in 
Shanghai on June 11th.37 
34 ZHONGHUA, et al. (ed). Zhongguo Gonghui Lishi Wenxian 
(1921.7-1927.7). China: Gongren Press, 1958. Available in: https://
www.marxists.org/chinese/pdf/history_of_international/china/
g1.pdf  Accessed on: 5 Mar. 2020. 
35 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1. 
36 Declaration of  National Students’ Federation, June 1925, see 
THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA. Wu Sa 
Yundong He Sheng Gang Bagong. Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Press, 1985. 
37 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1.
The shooting down of  the protestors in Shanghai 
and Qingdao soon angered workers and students in 
other cities. It is documented that at least 135 strikes 
nationwide were directly caused by the May 30 Incident 
to support Shanghai.38 As anti-British and anti-Japanese 
sentiment intensified and tended to be more militant, 
more violent clashes took place. On June 11th, during 
a demonstration in Hankou, protesting workers enga-
ged in a fight with the British police in the concession 
to prevent the police from arresting the students. The 
British marines opened fire on the protestors, resul-
ting in eight deaths and eleven injuries.39 The resent-
ment against British imperialism further escalated, and 
workers in Guangzhou and Hong Kong soon followed 
suite to support the workers in Shanghai and Hankou. 
In Hong Kong and Shamian (the foreign conces-
sion in Guangzhou), a general strike outbroke on June 
19th. Seamen, printers, and workers for the public trans-
port struck first. Workers in foreign trade, cargo and 
coalmine and other unions followed suite, and finally 
mechanics and dock workers stopped work. Within 15 
days, more than 250,000 workers were on strike.40 An 
important spur for the general strike was the Shaji Mas-
sacre on June 23rd. On that day, about 100,000 workers, 
peasants, military cadets, students and shopkeepers in 
Guangzhou took part in a demonstration,41 holding 
flags and banners written “Down with Imperialism”, 
“Abolishing the Consular Jurisdiction”, “Abolishing All 
Unequal Treaties”, and “Supporting Victims of  the May 
30 Massacre in Shanghai”.42  When they paraded along 
Shaji, the river bank opposite Shamian, the British and 
French troops opened fire from Shamian on the crowd. 
Fifty-two protestors died and more than 170 injured.43 
The killing on June 23rd further intensified the stri-
ke. A Strike Committee was formed by the end of  the 
month by the All-China Federation of  Trade Unions 
and decided to launch a massive boycott of  trade 
38 CHEN, T. The Labour Movement in China. International Labour 
Review, v. 15, n. 339, 1927; CHEN, T. Analysis of  Strikes in China, from 
1918 to 1926. London: Nabu Press, 2010.
39 THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA. Wu 
Sa Yundong He Sheng Gang Bagong. Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Press, 1985.
40 GUANGDONGSHENG et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Bagong Zil-
iao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980.
41 GUANGDONGSHENG et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Bagong Zil-
iao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980..
42 GUANGDONGSHENG et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Bagong Zil-
iao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980.










































































against the British in Guangzhou.44 Measures were 
taken, including blocking shipment and importation of  
the British goods and refusing the British currency. The 
workers leaving en masse from Hong Kong were main-
ly seamen, dock workers, factory workers, workers for 
public transport and public utilities, and coolies. Their 
strike effectively cut off  the food supply to the Hong 
Kong Island and the communication between the Hong 
Kong Island and the Kowloon district. Public infras-
tructure, such as sewage, was broken and left unrepai-
red. Garbage was dumped on the street and uncollec-
ted. Hong Kong (literally, the “fragrant port”) became 
a “stinking port”.45 As the strike and boycott continued 
throughout the months of  July and August, further 
measures to isolate the island were taken by the Strike 
Committee. No goods coming from Hong Kong and 
Macao could dock in Guangzhou; no British ships and 
ships bypassing Hong Kong and Macao could load at 
any port in Guangdong.46 Hong Kong became a “dead 
port”. For more than a year, all attempts at negotiation 
failed. The boycott caused an unprecedented economic 
loss to Hong Kong. Trade from Guangzhou to ports 
overseas was largely bogged down in July and August. It 
was documented that over the first eight months of  the 
general Guangdong – Hong Kong boycott, shipments 
in Guangzhou, Shantou and Hong Kong had reduced 
to 20%.47 About 25,000 tons of  goods arrived in Guan-
gzhou through Hong Kong in the first half  of  1925, 
and only 505 tons of  goods went through this route in 
the second half  of  the year, most of  which had already 
arrived in Shamian by the time of  the boycott.48 
2.3  “Take It Now!”: the taking down of the 
British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang
The anti-imperialist sentiment after the killing of  
the protestors on May 30th in Shanghai and June 23rd at 
44 HORROCKS, R. J. The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926: 
Hongkong workers in an anti-imperialist movement. 1994. Avail-
able in: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1145945.pdf  Accessed 
on: 21 Sept. 2020.
45 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009.
46 KUO, H-Y. Networks beyond empires: chinese business and nation-
alism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914-1941. Leiden: 
BRILL, 2014.
47 GUANGDONGSHENG et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Bagong Zil-
iao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980.  
48 GUANGDONGSHENG et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Bagong Zil-
iao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980. 
Shaji continued to grow throughout the year of  1926. 
More than 500 strikes and mass demonstrations were 
held in 1926.49 From these mass movements emerged 
not just economic demands (e.g., wage increases and 
improving working conditions). Economic demands 
were transformed into explicitly political ones concer-
ning the unequal treaties and extraterritoriality. In such 
transformation from the socioeconomical to the poli-
tical in this period of  the anti-imperialist movements, 
what is particularly interesting is in Hankou and Jiujiang 
in the early January of  1927. In both cities, protesting 
workers and coolies spontaneously took over the British 
concessions. In the most general strikes and boycotts 
of  the same period, the masses resisted against the im-
perialist rule and extraterritoriality often by directly tar-
geting foreign factories and capitalists. While the aboli-
tion of  concessions was indeed intended, this demand 
seemed to follow those more immediate ones about 
the improvement of  socioeconomic conditions of  the 
people. However, in Hankou and Jiujiang, foreign con-
cessions, the exceptional spaces of  law and order which 
were both the symbol and the (physical) source of  the 
oppression and exploitation of  Chinese people, became 
the direct object of  the anti-imperialist struggles. 
The seizure of  the British concession in Hankou star-
ted with an anti-imperialist protest on the afternoon of  
January 3rd, 1927, outside the boundaries of  the British 
concession. Barricades separated the agitated crowds 
and the bayonets-holding British marines. The angry 
protestors listened to lectures delivered by the impas-
sionate students, shouted slogans of  anti-British impe-
rialism, waved poles and threw stones. As the anger was 
being aroused, a clash happened between the crowd and 
the British machines.50 There were different accounts 
about the casualties of  the clash. The Chinese-language 
sources documented that one death and 30 injuries.51 
Whether this number was correct or not, it was obvious 
that a small sparkle of  violence would soon escalate 
nationwide. The provincial authority of  the Nationalist 
49 CHEN, T. Analysis of  Strikes in China, from 1918 to 1926. London: 
Nabu Press, 2010.
50 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
51 XINHUA NEWS AGENCY. Shouhui Hankou, Jiujiang Yingzujie 
de Douzheng People’s Daily. Beijing, 14 April 2007. Whereas according 
to Wilbur, five Chinese and three marines were injured, and no shots 
were fired. WILBUR, C. M. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-









































































Government, which had just moved from Guangzhou 
and established in Wuhan, immediately tried to forestall 
a bloody conflict by pledging to the British that they 
would take control over the crowds and demanding the 
British to withdraw the marines.52 The British authority 
of  the concession, learning from what had followed the 
May 30th and June 23rd, withdrew their forces and left 
the Chinese police to maintain order. The protestors 
also dispersed in the evening. However, in the after-
noon of  January 4th, protestors gathered again outside 
the British bund. Finding that the barricades were now 
open and policed by the Chinse, the crowds shouted, 
“Take it now!”, removed the sandbags and barbed wires 
and rushed into the concession.53 The police station of  
the concession was attacked by stones. The municipal 
council of  the concession decided to hand the station 
over to the Nationalist authorities; the Nationalist Go-
vernment soon took it over and set up a commission to 
administer the concession.54 
The British concession at Jiujiang was handed over 
to China in a similar fashion two days later. There, 
workers had already been on general strike in the clo-
sing months of  1926, demanding wage increases and 
paid holidays. The news about the clash in Hankou on 
January 3rd infuriated the workers in Jiujiang. A mass de-
monstration was soon organized to support protestors 
in Hankou. On the afternoon of  January 6th, protesting 
dockers, shouting “Down with the British Imperialists”, 
rushed into the British concession and removed the 
barricades around the boundaries. The British authority 
barely resisted and agreed to let the Nationalist Gover-
nment maintain order.55 On the next day, a Nationalist 
army entered and took over the concession.
While the KMT and the CPC had been mobili-
zing the masses and organizing strikes and boycotts, 
the mass actions of  attacking the British concessions 
in Hankou and Jiujiang were largely spontaneous and 
without leadership.56 It was the first time in the mo-
52 WILBUR, C. M. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
53 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009.
54 WILBUR, C. M. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
55  WILBUR, C. M. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.; ISAACS, H. The 
Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009.
56 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009.
dern history of  China, and indeed, the only time that 
foreign concessions were recovered  by mass action in 
such an unexpected way. We can imagine the reactions 
of  the frightened foreigners living in those privileged 
ghettoes, finding themselves, all of  a sudden, surroun-
ded by the angry Chinese. Stories about the looting and 
pillages by the “mobs” got told and retold all the way 
to the Shanghai International Settlement. Eyewitness 
accounts contradictory to those stories could also be 
found.57  Whatever the actual situation was, the mass ac-
tions in Hankou and Jiujiang were sufficiently alarming 
for the foreign powers in China. The British represent-
tives in China and the Nationalist Government soon 
started negotiating the formal transfer of  power in the 
two concessions. And by January 29th, Special Chinese 
Administrations were established in the two cities and 
former British municipal councils were dissolved. 
3  A brief Laclauan analysis of the 
populist characteristics of the 
Chinese anti-imperialist movements
The four cases – the May 30 Incident in Shanghai, 
the general Guangzhou – Hong Kong strike and boy-
cott, and the spontaneous attacks against the British 
concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang – exemplified the 
mass anti-imperialist movements in China in the mid 
1920s. With the diligent anti-imperialist propaganda 
of  the CPC and the KMT and the expansion of  the 
workers’ organisations throughout the whole country, 
the strikes and demonstrations were often participated 
57 Chapman described the attack in Hankou against the British 
concession, “there were some instances of  insolence and threats to-
ward foreigners; but no personal violence was done and no houses 
entered.” CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record 
of  the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928. Regard-
ing the degree of  mob violence in Jiujiang, Ransome observed that 
“very little furniture was broken and no windows, not even a very 
ugly ostentatious hanging lamp… A Chinese company officer…
on meeting a soldier with any loot, took it. from him and solemnly 
handed it to the Englishmen, who, as the loot was usually a scrap of  
curtain or other useless junk, dumped it in the gutter… It is curious 
to observe that at 6 p.m. of  that day a party of  fifteen, two men and 
the rest women, who had come down…from Kuling, came through 
the Chinese streets into the Concession and down to the ships with-
out molestation.” RANSOME, A. The chinese puzzle. Australian: Allen 
& Unwin, Ltd, 1927. Available in: https://mcgill.worldcat.org/title/










































































by tens of  thousands of  people. However, it may still 
be too intuitive to claim these movements as populist. 
Such a claim may also easily fall into the tendency of  
conflating populism with xenophobic nationalism, whi-
ch can often be found in the studies and commentaries 
of  contemporary populism.58 Here, I draw on Ernesto 
Laclau’s theory of  populism to analyse and stress the 
populist characteristics of  these movements. To be 
sure, choosing Laclau’s theory does not presuppose that 
his theory and his approach to populism are universally 
accepted. The very term of  populism indeed remains 
largely contested in the literature about populism.59 The 
reason of  choosing Laclau’s theory is due to its empha-
sis on populism as a political logic,60 as “a way of  cons-
tructing the political”61, “a way of  doing politics”62. This 
approach, detaching populism with specific political 
programs and ideological contents, allows for a closer 
look at the formation, the structuring and the evolu-
tion of  the movements which we may intuitively label 
as populist. It enables an understanding of, not just what 
claims and demands are made in those movements, but 
also how those claims and demands are made. 
According to Laclau, populism cannot be proper-
ly understood by examining any particular sociological 
phenomenon. Populism, claims Laclau, “has no refe-
rential unity because it is ascribed not to a delimitable 
phenomenon but to a social logic whose effects cut 
across many phenomena.”63 Laclau approaches popu-
lism as a discursive strategy of  constructing a political 
frontier that separates the society into “the people” and 
“the enemy” and calls for “the people” to unite and re-
sist against “the enemy”.64 Arato summarises these six 
elements of  the Laclauan populism: First, the appeal 
to “the people” and “popular sovereignty” which work 
as empty signifiers, uniting heterogeneous demands and 
grievances; second, the claim that a part of  society can 
58 ALSTON, P. The Populist Challenge to Human Rights. Journal 
of  Human Rights Practice, v. 9, n. 1, p. 1–15, fev. 2017.; POSNER, E. 
A. Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash.  Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers, v. 66, 2017.
59 MUDDE, C.; KALTWASSER, C. R. Populism: a very short intro-
duction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
60 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
61 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
62 MOUFFE, C. For a Left Populism. Rio de Janeiro: Verso Books, 
2018.
63 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
64  LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.; 
MOUFFE, C. For a Left Populism. Rio de Janeiro: Verso Books, 
2018.”plainCitation”:”Laclau (n 60
stand for and represent the whole; third, the construc-
tion of  a political frontier of  antagonism; fourth, the 
unification through strong identification with a leader, 
or a unified leadership group; fifth, the use of  rhetoric 
and affective argumentation and justification rather than 
rational arguments; sixth, the insistence on a strong no-
tion of  politics as opposed to mere “ordinary” politics 
or policy.65
With these elements in mind, I argue that the popu-
list character of  the mass movements in 1920s China 
was not only attributed to their strong tone of  natio-
nalism and anti-imperialism, which created a prima facie 
line of  demarcation and antagonism. Race and nationa-
lity were important, but certainly not the only criteria 
that divided the society between the “underdogs” and 
the elitist enemies. The construction of  “the people” 
and the unification of  different social strata to form 
the political frontier were not self-evident either. Ten-
sions deriving from the different interests and demands 
of  specific social sectors and groups had to be strai-
ghtened out in order to form a political coalition and 
a populist subject, “the people”.66 The general strikes 
and boycotts in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong 
illustrated vividly a strong political coalition comprised 
of  very different social classes and sectors. Each class 
– factory workers, peasants, students, shopkeepers, as 
well as the Chinese nationalist bourgeoisies – and each 
faction within the class of  workers had their specific 
and particular demands.67 Under the general banner of  
anti-imperialism, these demands were reframed to make 
them relatively compatible with each other, even though 
certain particular interests had to be compromised or 
sacrificed.68 The construction of  a populist subject was, 
hence, predicated on the internal contradiction between 
65 ARATO, A. How We Got Here? Transition Failures, Their 
Causes and the Populist Interest in the Constitution. Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, v. 45, n. 9-10, p. 1106-1115, 2019.
66 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
67 MAO, Z. Analysis of  the Classes in Chinese Society. China: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1956. Available in: http://collections.mun.ca/
PDFs/radical/AnalysisoftheClassesinChineseSociety.pdf  Accessed 
on: 5 Mar. 2020.
68 For example, in the Guangzhou- Hong Kong strike, Chinese 
merchants and peasants suffered a great deal from the blockage of  
trade and shipment. The strike and boycott also caused extreme dif-
ficulties on citizens lived in Guangdong who were dependent on 
the imported rice and western medicine. HORROCKS, R. J. The 
Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926: Hongkong workers in an 
anti-imperialist movement. 1994. Available in: https://core.ac.uk/









































































what Laclau calls the equivalence and difference.69 As 
the construction of  “the people” being constantly con-
tested, so was the political alliance that unified a large 
spectrum of  social sectors. This is demonstrated by 
several historical studies which find that, counter the 
narrative about the voluntary self-organization of  the 
workers, violence and intimidation were used by the 
unionists and pickets to force the reluctant workers to 
go on strikes.70 
The identification of  the enemy was similarly blurry 
and fluctuating, although “the foreign imperialists” see-
med to have more concrete social referents. Apart from 
the foreign capitalists, foreign companies, foreign armed 
forces, and the foreign administration under extraterri-
toriality, the Chinese who had close ties with the British 
and the Japanese were also excluded from “the people”. 
The Beijing Government and its officials who had the 
support of  the foreign powers and largely accepted the 
Versailles-Washington system were seen as traitors, des-
pite the diplomatic efforts made by the Beijing Govern-
ment. In addition, during the Guangzhou – Hong Kong 
boycott, which caused tremendous economic loss to the 
Chinese merchants in Guangzhou, those who traded with 
the British were condemned by the CPC as the “running 
dogs” of  the imperialists.71 The antagonistic division of  
the society into two camps and the intrinsic ambiguity 
of  the division can be seen from Mao Zedong’s Analysis 
of  the Classes in Chinese Society. Reflecting on the re-
cent mass movements, Mao wrote in March 1926 about 
distinguishing the real friends from the real enemies and 
uniting the former to attack the latter: 
[A]ll those in league with imperialism – the 
warlords, the bureaucrats, the compradors, the 
big landlords, and the reactionary section of  the 
intelligentsia dependent to them – are our enemies. 
The industrial proletariat is the leading force in our 
revolution. All sections of  the semi-proletariat and 
the petty bourgeoisie are our closest friends. As 
to the vacillating middle class, its right wing may 
become our enemy and its left wing may become 
our friend, but we must be constantly on our 
guard towards the latter and not allow it to create 
confusion in our front.72
69 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
70 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
71 HORROCKS, R. J. The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926: 
Hongkong workers in an anti-imperialist movement. 1994. Avail-
able in: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1145945.pdf  Accessed 
on: 21 Sept. 2020.
72 MAO, Z. Analysis of  the Classes in Chinese Society. China: Foreign 
So, empirical referents for the terms of  “the people” 
and “the foreign imperialists” can be relatively easily iden-
tified at the extremes of  the broad spectrum of  social 
strata in the Chinese society. However, between the two 
extremes of  the spectrum, “the people” and “the foreign 
imperialists” were used more like the Laclauan “empty 
signifier”, the “name”, through which different social sec-
tors and groups, with ambiguous political standings and 
heterogeneous interests, were identified and represen-
ted.73 The intrinsic ambiguity of  the terms and the internal 
tension of  the political frontier served like a double-ed-
ged sword: the masses of  the Chinese society, regardless 
of  their particular backgrounds, soon found a common 
identity and representation, i.e., the nationalist subject who 
resisted against the rule of  foreign imperialism; neverthe-
less, not all chains in the coalition were equally strong and 
determined, which undermined the political frontier. In-
deed, by the mid 1927, the anti-imperialist frontier foun-
ded on the KMT-CPC coalition broke down, as “the de-
sire of  the ‘poor to become “less poor” clashed with the 
ambition of  the “less poor” to become richer’.74
In the construction of  the political frontier through 
the operation of  empty signifiers, rational arguments 
gave way to rhetoric, affective and performative ones. 
Impassionate students giving anti-imperialist addresses 
in the mass demonstrations were described by the Bri-
tish “pose like martyrs” and “behave like mobs”.75 In 
numerous petitions and declarations, extremely agitative 
words can be found, depicting the massacres in Shan-
ghai, Hankou and Guangzhou and stressing the precari-
ty of  the life and freedom of  the Chinese people under 
the threat of  imperialist violence. In addition, through 
those sensational and provocative languages, the mass 
movements made bold political demands and objecti-
ves, targeting the historical sources of  the mass frus-
tration, i.e., the unequal treaties and extraterritoriality 
(which were called the national humiliation). Not only 
were reconciliations and compromises rejected, legalist 
solutions were denied as well. As the CPC declared on 
June 5, 1925:
Languages Press, 1956. Available in: http://collections.mun.ca/
PDFs/radical/AnalysisoftheClassesinChineseSociety.pdf  Accessed 
on: 5 Mar. 2020. 
73 LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 2005.
74 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009.
75 KUO, H-Y. Networks beyond empires: chinese business and nation-










































































the [May 30] incident in Shanghai is not accidental. 
Its nature is not legal, but completely political… 
The objective of  the resistance movement in 
Shanghai and nationwide against the British and 
Japanese imperialism shall not stop at punishing 
the perpetrators, compensating the victims and 
apologies. The solution is not in law but in politics. 
The prime objective should be the abolition of  all 
unequal treaties and all privileges of  the imperialists 
in China … This resistance movement in Shanghai 
and nationwide triggered by the massacre will 
be a long-term national struggle. Its outcome 
will not depend on whether the British and 
Japanese imperialists accept the conditions about 
punishment, compensation and apologies.76
In brief, the populist character of  these movements 
described previously was not simply due to its large 
number of  participants and its confrontational standing 
against the foreigners. Instead, the populist character 
was reflected by the imprecision and ambiguity in the 
construction of  the people and the enemy, the call for 
radical political solutions, and the highly affective and 
sensational discourses that completely denounced the 
imperialist rule of  the game. The intrinsic tension of  
the political frontier meant that sustaining the anti-im-
perialist movements was challenging and required con-
tinuous mobilization and reconstruction of  the antago-
nistic line. Except the British concessions in Hankou 
and Jiujiang, many strikes and boycotts, although making 
determined political demands and objectives, eventually 
died down; the reward for the striking workers was lar-
gely limited to pay raises or compensations.77 However, 
the net effect of  these movements was that the foreign 
powers, especially the United Kingdom, became extre-
mely cautious and tried everything to avoid conflicts 
with the Chinese people, in order to protect its interests 
and the safety of  its nationals in China.
76 SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES I OF H. 
Wu Sa Yundong Shi Liao. Shangai: Shanghai Remin Press, 1981. v. 1.
77 As documented by Chen Ta, among the 135 recorded strikes 
following the May 30 Incidents, there were one case of  complete 
success, 35cases of  partial success, one case of  failure and 98 cases 
not reporting. The right to organize trade unions was recognised 
in 17 cases, and in 16 cases, the workers received a subsidy for the 
strike period in addition to an improvement in working conditions. 
In 18 cases, the strikers obtained wage increases. CHEN, T. The 
Labour Movement in China. International Labour Review, v. 15, n. 339, 
1927.  
4  Impacts on the process of treaty-
revision and the abolishment of 
extraterritoriality
4.1  Direct impacts: the British December 
Memorandum and the Treaty Alteration 
Programme
As mentioned in the introduction, after the Paris 
Peace Conference, the Beijing Government had star-
ted bilateral negotiations with each foreign power on 
the treaty revision and the abolition of  extraterrito-
riality. Although making some important progress,78 
the Beijing Government, who accepted the Versailles-
-Washington system but was unable to press the Uni-
ted Kingdom on the process of  treaty revision, was 
criticized by the nationalists as traitorous. Drastically 
different from the policy of  the Beijing government, 
the Nationalist regime in Guangzhou, while mobilizing 
anti-imperialist movements, propagated the “revolutio-
nary diplomacy”79 and declared all the unequal treaties 
were null. The May 30 Incident escalated the sentiment 
of  anti-British imperialism to an unprecedented level. 
The general Guangzhou – Hong Kong strike and boy-
cott further brought significant economic loss to the 
British trade and investment. Following the May 30 In-
cident and the Guangzhou – Hong Kong strike, the UK 
government had started to review its policy regarding 
China in order to defuse the crisis. A clear example of  
the changing attitude can be found in the discussion by 
Victor Wellesley, then Deputy Under Secretary for Fo-
reign Affairs at the Foreign Office:
[The Nationalist Movement] is not a transient one. 
It is a thing that has come to stay, to grow and 
to be reckoned with. The two great aims of  this 
movement are: 1. complete fiscal autonomy and 2. 
complete surrender of  extraterritoriality… Nothing 
short of  complete surrender on both points will 
give real satisfaction to the Chinese. The time is 
now quite clearly passed when we could afford to 
ignore such demands or browbeat the Chinese into 
submission. We have consequently got to realize 
78 During the First World War, China declared war on the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and abolished German and Austro-Hungarian 
extraterritorial jurisdictions and concessions. After the Soviet revo-
lution in 1917, the Beijing government terminated China’s diplo-
matic relationship with the Russian Empire and abolished Russian 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and concessions on September 23, 1920.










































































that in the face of  this growing determination to 
be rid of  foreign shackles we cannot indefinitely 
maintain our Treaty rights and privileges and that 
they must sooner or later be surrendered unless we 
are prepared to use force which I think is generally 
admitted to be out of  the question.80 
In December 1926, the British government issued 
the Proposals to the Powers Concerning China, also 
known as the December Memorandum. In the Memo-
randum, the UK government reaffirmed the spirit of  
the Washington Conference and called upon all treaty 
powers at the Washington Conference to declare their 
readiness to negotiate on treaty revision with China, as 
soon as China had a government. In particular, the Pro-
posal suggested that:
[the treaty powers] should abandon the idea that 
the economic and political development of  China 
can only be secured under foreign tutelage… [and] 
should expressly disdain any intention of  forcing 
foreign control upon an unwilling China. While 
calling upon China to maintain that respect for the 
sanctity of  treaties which is the primary obligation 
common to all civilized States, the Powers should 
recognise both the essential justice of  China’s claim 
for Treaty revision and the difficulty under present 
conditions of  negotiating new treaties in place of  
the old, and they should therefore modify their 
traditional attitude of  a rigid insistence on the strict 
letter of  treaty rights.81
The Memorandum continued to call upon all the 
treaty powers to stop protesting on some minor matters, 
to consider China’s reasonable proposals with sympathy 
even if  the proposals were against strict interpretation 
of  treaty rights, and to maintain harmonious relations 
with China “without waiting for or insisting on the prior 
establishment of  a strong Central Government”.82
The December Memorandum, in addition, urged 
80 Wellesley, Situation in China, Foreign Office Minute, 12 August 
1925, [F3860/2/10] (FO 371/10922) at 92-93. Another example of  
the changing attitudes can be found in Eric Teichman’s remark in his 
Memorandum on the position of  Foreigners in China today, with 
Special Reference to the Questions of  Treaty Revision that “it is as 
useless for us to bury our heads like ostriches in the san and ignore 
these inevitable developments as it is for the Chinese to ask for the 
moon and suppose that China can leap at one bound from her old 
state to one of  complete equality with the nations of  the West. It 
is therefore necessary for all us us…to face the facts of  the situa-
tion and be prepared in due course to adjust ourselves gradually to 
new conditions of  trade and residence in China.” August 6, 1925 [F 
3678/2/10] (FO 371/10921) at 237.
81 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
82 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
the treaty powers to unconditionally and immediately 
authorize the Chinese authorities to levy surtaxes throu-
ghout China.83 This proposal was immediately agreed 
by the US, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, but objec-
ted by Japan.84 Apart from the unconditional authori-
zation of  the levy of  surtaxes, the Memorandum was 
more suggestive of  the British attitude and intention, 
rather than planning any concrete measures to be taken 
to revise relevant treaties. Meanwhile, both the Beijing 
Government and the Nationalist Government were 
unhappy with the document, each claiming themselves 
as the only legitimate Chinese government and blaming 
the British for implicitly supporting the rival regime. 
The negotiations between the UK and China remained 
difficult. The memorandum did not produce any imme-
diate progress for the negotiation with China and nee-
ded careful implementation by the British government 
and its representatives in China. Nevertheless, it set out 
the tone for the subsequent interactions with the Chi-
nese authorities. 
A few days after the publication of  the British Pro-
posals, large demonstrations in Hankou and Jiujiang 
led to the seizure of  the British concessions by crowd 
actions. As mentioned earlier, the British authorities ac-
cepted the proposals by the Nationalist Government to 
withdraw their armed forces, so as to avoid a repetition 
of  the May 30 and the June 23 incidents, and eventually 
placed the concessions under the administration of  the 
Nationalist government. Compelled by the dangerous 
escalation of  the events, the British government accep-
ted the seizure of  the British concessions as fait accom-
pli. The events in Hankou and Jiujiang had pushed the 
British government to directly approach the Nationalist 
regime who had been advocating the policy of  “revo-
lutionary diplomacy”, to deal with the formal handover 
of  the concessions and to seek the assurance from the 
Nationalist Government that the Hankou and Jiujiang 
incidents would not happen again. 
On January 27th, 1927, the British government pro-
posed to the Nationalist Governments its Treaty Al-
teration Programme to appease the nationalists. The 
proposal expressed the intentions, inter alia, to recogni-
ze Chinese law as applicable and modern Chinese law 
83 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
84 TANG, Q. Treaty revision campaign of  the Beijing Government, 1912-
1928: out of  the shadow of  the ‘Abrogation of  Unequal Treaties’. 









































































courts as competent for cases involving British subjects, 
to recognize the Chinese taxation as applicable to the 
British subjects in China, and to negotiate on the modi-
fication of  municipal administration of  British conces-
sions in China and on the transfer of  police control of  
British concessions to the Chinese authorities.85 
On the same day of  the issuance of  the Treaty Al-
teration Programme, the British representative Owen 
O’Malley told Eugene Chen, representative of  the Na-
tionalist government in Wuhan, that the British gover-
nment was willing to concede as long as the Nationalist 
Government assured that any modification about the 
status of  British concessions and the Shanghai Interna-
tional Settlement would be made only by negotiation.86 
Chen responded by declaring that “the liberation of  
China from the yoke of  foreign imperialism need not 
necessarily involve any armed conflict between Chine-
se Nationalism and the foreign Powers”87, and that the 
Nationalist Government was ready to negotiate sepa-
rately with the treaty powers for a settlement of  treaty 
and other related questions on a basis of  “economic 
equality and mutual respect for each other’s political and 
territorial sovereignty”.88 Furthermore, the Nationalist 
Government considered the proposals of  the Treaty 
Alteration Programme unsatisfactory and inadequate 
but was willing to consider them as a basis of  a com-
prehensive and reasoned settlement of  the existing di-
fferences between the Nationalist Government and the 
United Kingdom.89 
In short, the populist movements of  anti-imperia-
lism compelled the United Kingdom, the most impor-
tant foreign power in China, to significantly change its 
attitude toward China and concede to some of  the na-
tionalist demands regarding extraterritoriality. While a 
complete and immediate abolition of  extraterritoriality 
was still impossible to attain, the vast energies genera-
ted by the populist movements both indicated and fa-
cilitated the gradual crumbling of  the imperial rule of  
the international relations. This slow but fundamental 
85 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
86 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
87 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
88 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
89 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
transformation of  the international order was seen by 
UK’s explicit acknowledgement of  the essential justice 
of  China’s nationalist demands, the clear exclusion of  
the possibility to use force to maintain its imperial rule 
in China, its willingness to go beyond the strict and le-
galist approach to treaty interpretation, and its endorse-
ment of  the spirit of  the Washington Conference. 
4.2  Indirect impacts: providing leverage for the 
Beijing government
As the anti-imperialist movements in the southern 
part of  China went in full swing, the Beijing Govern-
ment was also actively seeking diplomatic breakthrou-
ghs to recover China’s sovereignty and change the status 
of  extraterritoriality. Although the populist movements, 
mobilized by the Nationalist Government and the CPC, 
criticized the Beijing Government as traitorous and re-
presentative of  the foreign imperialism, the movements 
provided the Beijing Government with some interesting 
leverage in its negotiation with the foreign powers in the 
process of  treaty revision. 
The December Memorandum issued by the British 
government at the end of  1926 to appease the natio-
nalist and anti-British sentiments in China significantly 
eased the diplomacy of  the Beijing Government with 
other treaty powers. An interesting example here is Bel-
gium. The publication of  the December Memorandum 
had an unintended consequence for the Belgian con-
cession in Tianjin. Belgium was the weakest among all 
the foreign powers in China. While having made huge 
investments, Belgium did not have troops in Chinese 
territories and hence, relied on the solidarity of  the fo-
reign powers to protect its interest in China. The Beijing 
Government approached Belgium in April 1926 on the 
revision of  the treaty of  1865. Invoking the doctrine of  
rebus sic stantibus,90 it expressed the intention to terminate 
the same treaty by October 27th, 1926 and to replace it 
with new agreements.91 Unable to agree on the content 
of  a modus vivendi with Belgium, the Beijing Gover-
nment unilaterally terminated the treaty on November 
90 TSENG, Y-H. The termination of  unequal treaties in international 
law: studies in comparative jurisprudence and Conventional Law 
of  Nations. Pequin: The Commercial Press, Ltd, 1931. Available in: 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/trmunql0001&i=75 
Accessed on:  3 Mar. 2020.
91 KOO, V. K. W. Wellington Koo’s Foreign Policy: some selected docu-









































































6th, 1926.92 Belgium protested against the unilateral ter-
mination of  the treaty and submitted the dispute to the 
Permanent Court of  International Justice. However, by 
late December 1926, the British December Memoran-
dum, which called upon the treaty powers to maintain 
harmonious relationships with China and to consider 
China’s reasonable proposals with sympathy, signposted 
a significant change of  the British policy toward Chi-
na. The timing of  its issuance dramatically changed the 
power dynamics between China and Belgium. Following 
the December Memorandum, Belgium agreed to resu-
me negotiation with the Beijing Government and to 
enter into new agreements on the basis of  equality and 
respecting each other’s territorial sovereignty. On 17 Ja-
nuary 1927, Belgium declared its abandonment of  the 
concession in Tianjin and returned it to China.93 
The incidents in Hankou and Jiujiang in early Janua-
ry of  1927 were also turned into an opportunity for the 
Beijing Government to press the British on the nego-
tiation of  treaty revision. The Beijing Government was 
unhappy that the Nationalist Government, whose had 
propagated the “revolutionary diplomacy”, refused to 
recognize the treaties and had resorted to violence, was 
able to make such an important progress of  restoring 
two British concessions in the south. The Beijing Go-
vernment believed that as it recognized the treaties and 
sought peaceful negotiations with the UK, it deserved 
more favourable treatment than what the Nationalist 
regime achieved, and that the UK should concede and 
agree on the terms made by the Beijing Government. 
The Beijing Government claimed that, otherwise, it 
would no longer help the UK supress the anti-British 
movements in the north and that it would even consider 
restoring the British concession in Tianjin in a fashion 
similar to those of  Hankou and Jiujiang.94 
To prevent the situation in the north from becoming 
as thorny as that in the South, the British government 
made the same proposals of  the Treaty Alteration Pro-
gramme to the Beijing Government on January 28th. 
The Beijing Government did not want to be restrained 
by the British proposals in the formal negotiations on 
92 KOO, V. K. W. Wellington Koo’s Foreign Policy: some selected docu-
ments. Shanghai: Wunsz King ed, Kelly ad Walsh, 1931.
93  QUIGLEY, H. S. Foreign concessions in chinese hands. 1928. Availa-
ble in: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1928-10-01/
foreign-concessions-chinese-hands Accessed on: 5 Mar. 2020.
94 TANG, Q. Treaty revision campaign of  the Beijing Government, 1912-
1928: out of  the shadow of  the ‘Abrogation of  Unequal Treaties’. 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.
the treaty revision, only accepted the proposals as the 
basis for the informal negotiation about the unilateral 
abandonment by the British of  its rights and interests 
in China, rather than the basis for the treaty revision.95 
In the next few months, the two parties used the propo-
sals as a starting point for the negotiation on the status 
of  the British concession in Tianjin and signed a preli-
minary proposal to put the concession under the joint 
control of  the Chinese, the British and the American on 
April 22nd, 1927.96 
The Beijing Government survived for another year. 
During this time, the internal factional conflicts and the 
war with the National Government had largely limi-
ted further diplomatic progress on the treaty revision. 
However, at least, during the high tide of  the nationa-
list and anti-imperialist movements in the years of  1926 
and 1927, the Beijing Government had taken advantage 
of  them to advance its demands in its interactions with 
the foreign powers, even though it was also helping the 
foreign powers to quiet down the anti-imperialist sen-
timents and suppressing the communist movements in 
the north. By reaping the fruits of  the anti-imperialist 
movements, the Beijing Government was able to put 
the British government in a difficult situation, i.e., that 
the UK had to be, at least, as generous to the Beijing 
Government as it had been to the Nationalist Gover-
nment. As Miles Lampson, then British Minister to 
China, remarked, “We must not at present take sides 
(between the north and the south) if  we can help it or 
be rushed by either of  them…Our treaty modification 
programme was made simultaneously to China as a 
whole. The North are in process of  accepting it, the 
South so far are not. But that is no justification for hol-
ding up the offer to the North nor is it in any case now 
possible to do so…”97
4.3  Aftermath: the fragility of the populist 
movements
The takeover of  the British concessions in Hankou 
and Jiujiang had one additional serious consequence 
95 TANG, Q. Treaty revision campaign of  the Beijing Government, 1912-
1928: out of  the shadow of  the ‘Abrogation of  Unequal Treaties’. 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.
96 TANG, Q. Treaty revision campaign of  the Beijing Government, 1912-
1928: out of  the shadow of  the ‘Abrogation of  Unequal Treaties’. 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.










































































for the system of  extraterritoriality. The takeover by 
mass action, as well as the stories of  looting and haras-
sment against the foreigners, soon alerted the foreign 
authorities in the Shanghai International Settlement. 
The British Consul and the naval commander-in-chef  
estimated that Shanghai would be the next target of  
the military campaign of  the Nationalist against the 
Beijing Government in the north and requested the 
military reinforcement of  Shanghai.98 While the nego-
tiation between O’Malley and Chen was taking place 
in Hankou in January, the British government sent an 
expeditionary force of  English and Indian infantry to 
Shanghai, including cavalry, tanks, aeroplanes, artillery 
and hospital units, and another force of  a few thou-
sands to Hong Kong in reserve. The total number of  
the military dispatch was more than 20,000 men.99 The 
Japanese, American and French governments also sent 
troops to reinforce Shanghai.100 The move by the British 
was protested by Chen who almost pulled out from the 
deal with O’Malley in Hankou.101 A compromise was 
reached eventually: Chen issued a formal statement to 
ensure that the Nationalist Government would not use 
force to effect the changes of  the status of  the conces-
sions; Austen Chamberlain, then British foreign secre-
tary, also assured that the British forces would retreat to 
Hong Kong, if  the Hankou agreement was signed and 
no further emergence happened.102 
However, the situation in Shanghai remained inten-
se. The anti-imperialist movements had not gone down. 
Instead, inspired by the success in Hankou and Jiujiang, 
workers’ organizations and communists in Shanghai 
continued to rally the movements. Furthermore, from 
those movements emerged some sort of  rule by the 
workers and communists in Shanghai.103 The British, as 
98 WILBUR, C. M. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
99 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
100 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
101 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
102 WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (ed.). The China Year Book. China: 
Tientsin Press, 1928.
103 According to Isaacs, the workers’ pickets patrolled the city and 
had 2700 men and 1700 rifles. A provisional government, in the 
name of  Shanghai’s workers, was even set up under the Communist 
control which was ready to take over political power throughout 
the Shanghai area. ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. 
well as other foreign powers in Shanghai, did and could 
not concede this time, as Shanghai hosted huge amount 
of  foreign businesses and nationals. Armed forces kept 
being dispatched to Shanghai to guard the concessions 
and to protect the foreigners. The reinforcement of  
Shanghai by foreign military forces was seen by the na-
tionalists as a dangerous provocation and an insult to 
China’s sovereignty, hence irritating the anti-imperialist 
sentiments even more.104 On March 24th, 1927, a major 
attack on the foreigners happened in the Nationalist-
-controlled Nanjing by a Chinese troop of  a rival mi-
litary faction. As a result of  the attack, the number of  
foreign troops garrisoning in Shanghai was soon increa-
sed to 30,000, and 45 foreign warships anchored at the 
Huangpu River for immediate action.105 In addition, the 
UK, Japan, the US, France, and Italy demanded the Na-
tionalist Government for satisfaction. The Nationalist 
Government replied with a proposal of  setting up an 
international commission of  inquiry to investigate the 
attack in Nanjing and meanwhile, made the counter-
-claim regarding the unequal treaties: 
the best guarantee for the effective protection of  
British and other foreign lives and property in China 
lies in the removal of  the fundamental cause of  the 
present trouble between Nationalist China and the 
Powers who continue to sustain the regime of  the 
unequal treaties. It is these inequitable treaties that 
constitute the chief  danger to foreign lives and 
property in China, and this danger will persist as 
long as effective government is rendered difficult 
by foreign insistence on conditions which are at 
once a humiliation and a menace to (the Nationalist 
China).106 
A deadlock, hence, arose from the escalating ten-
sions: the growing and increasingly militant anti-im-
perialist movements, as well as other anti-foreignist 
military factions, alerted the foreign powers and com-
pelled them to defend their interests in Shanghai, which 
provoked more indignation on the part of  the Chinese 
who wanted the complete abrogation of  the unequal 
treaties and extraterritoriality. Shanghai became one of  
the most difficult international issues from 1927 to early 
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009.
104 CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a record of  
the period under communist control as seen from the nationalist 
capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Constable & CO LTD, 1928.
105 ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2009.
106  HC Deb 26 April 1927, vol 205, c665, at c667, Available in: htt-
ps://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1927/apr/26/









































































1930s.107 The deadlock was, however, partly resolved in 
April 1927 when the KMT – CPC alliance was broken. 
The Nationalist Government had internally split and 
the right-wing part of  the KMT led by General Jiang 
Jieshi established a government in Nanjing and started 
a nationwide reign of  terror. The communists were 
purged from the KMT, and numerous labour and com-
munist organizations were disbanded and largely des-
troyed. In Shanghai, foreign troops also participated in 
the raids against the workers with the permission of  the 
Nanjing Government. As a result, the political frontier 
of  anti-imperialism collapsed, and the mass movements 
died down. In June 1928, the Nanjing Government 
overthrew the Beijing Government and united the en-
tire China. Departing from the early Nationalist policy 
of  “revolutionary diplomacy”, the Nanjing Govern-
ment inherited the diplomatic policy and results of  the 
Beijing Government and resumed the negotiations with 
the foreign powers on treaty revision. 
5 Conclusion
The mass movements in the 1920s in China had 
unique international and domestic conditions. The rise 
of  national consciousness at home coalesced with, and 
was strengthened by, the rise of  Wilsonianism and Bol-
shevism internationally. Meanwhile, the First World War 
also significantly changed the structure of  the domina-
tion by the Western powers in China, compelling them 
to readjust their positions to the new conditions in Chi-
na. Populism, seen as a way of  doing politics, featured 
in this period by forging the alliances of  different social 
sectors and classes in China and uniting them around 
the same political cause of  anti-imperialism. In the four 
events that I have discussed in Section 2, the “under-
dogs” – identified both by their race and classes – were 
primarily motivated by the grievances caused by their 
socioeconomic conditions. However, in building the 
political frontier of  anti-imperialism, socioeconomic 
demands were transformed into highly political ones. 
The hardship in life that the Chinese people had to face 
107 WANG, M. The publication and abandonment of  the report of  
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every day was, then, connected with and even attribu-
ted to the domination and exploitation by the foreign 
powers in China. In this transformation from the so-
cioeconomical to the political, the brutal reactions of  
the foreign powers in China to people’s demands, as 
well as the reactions of  the Chinese local authorities de-
pendent on the foreign military support, in turn, stimu-
lated and accelerated this transformation and provided 
a strong anti-imperialist lens to the perception and the 
framing of  the frustrations and miseries that people ex-
perienced. 
As the imperialist domination in China was not 
simply political and military, but also legal and legali-
sed, the Chinese populism of  the 1920s attacked the 
legal underpinnings and framework of  the imperialist 
domination. The primary targets of  this radical politi-
cal frontier were the unequal treaties and the system of  
extraterritoriality, and the way of  resisting against them 
was by neither formal political negotiations, nor inter-
national adjudications, although some side-effects on 
the legal and political processes indeed occurred. This 
rejection of  the formal political and legal procedures 
was in sharp contrast with the policy and method of  the 
Beijing Government. The Beijing Government, while 
unilaterally terminated a few treaties (e.g., the treaties 
with Germany, Austria and Belgium), never denounced 
the pre-existing treaties as null ab initio but invoked the 
Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine to seek treaty revisions. The 
way of  the populist resistance was something outside 
and profoundly subversive of  the extant international 
legal system. From organized strikes and boycotts of  
trade to spontaneous mass actions, what was claimed 
and demanded was not a different viewpoint about in-
ternational law but a completely different political and 
legal order. The masses were “asking for the moon”,108 
as it were. In such an irrational confrontation, violence 
was perhaps not only difficult to avoid but a precondi-
tion: pushing forward such claims itself  (e.g., an outright 
rejection of  the treaties and the system of  extraterrito-
riality) constituted a violence against the existing legal 
order and logic. The violence caused by the irrationality 
of  the confrontation was further augmented by the po-
pulist way of  creating the confrontation and initiating 
political action, as populism always relies on imprecise 
and flexible terms and simplified dichotomies. In short, 
108 Eric Teichman’s remark in the Memorandum on the position 
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the populist resistance against foreign imperialism in 
the 1920s in China was beyond the comprehension and 
appropriation of  the existing international legal order. 
The populist movements further sought to radicalise 
that legal order into a new one.   
From the claims made by those movements in the 
1920s, what is also interesting is that the claims did not 
quite give the impression of  nostalgie de la boue, or an 
isolationism that aimed to disconnect China from the 
international political economy. In addition, as the anti-
-imperialist frontier also united the national bourgeoi-
ses, the nationalist attack on the imperialist economic 
domination in China had not yet turn into a full-fledged 
communist objective of  dismantling global capitalism. 
Instead, in the populist claims, we can discern the hope 
that international trades and investments would sti-
ll flourish in a new legal and world order founded on 
the sovereign and racial equality. This hope was quite 
plainly reflected in the demands of  the striking workers. 
They did not argue that foreigners should not build fac-
tories in China and should not hire them, and they did 
not argue that the Chinese workers should only work 
for the Chinese capitalists. Rather, what they resisted 
against was the impunity with which the foreign capi-
talists could abuse them, and what they demanded was 
their rights to be recognized and respected by their 
foreign employers. As for the abolition of  the foreign 
concessions, the protestors did not demand the foreig-
ners to leave, but that the Chinese residents who were 
also taxpayers in the concessions should at least have a 
say in the administration and government of  the con-
cessions as well. Hence, these demands suggested a 
world vision which was not really Manichean, but more 
ambiguous and more complicated. While this subtly 
non-Manichean feature of  this world vision may lead 
to its cooption, this world vision did not accept easy 
reconciliation and surface adjustment – an immediate 
improvement of  socioeconomic status and conditions 
was the direct cause of  the mass movement but not the 
endgame. This radicality and the “irrationality” of  the 
populist world vision contained the progressive poten-
tial of  correcting the deep-seated injustice of  the world 
political economy and international law, while avoi-
ding the paradox of  reinforcing the logic of  “colonial 
compartmentalisation”109.   
109 FANON, F. The Wretched of  the Earth. Chicago: Richard Philcox 
tr, Grove Press, 2004.
However, as the historical events turned out, the 
progressive potential of  the populist movements was, 
at the same time, frail. The political frontier of  anti-im-
perialism was full of  internal conflicts and the populist 
energy could easily be captured by the right wing who 
would in turn kill the movements. As the movements 
died down in April 1927, the lesson about the progres-
sive potential of  populism to transform international 
law and to bring out a different world got largely bu-
ried. Fast forward almost a hundred years, the kind of  
populism that was seen in the national liberation and 
anticolonial movements attracts far less attention in the 
mainstream legal scholarship than those populist move-
ments in established democracies. This article, I hope, 
would contribute to the rediscovery of  the legacy of  
populism in the development of  international law, not 
only just how populism poses a danger to internatio-
nal law but how populism directs international law to 
reconsider some of  its fundamental questions, such as 
its legitimacy and the alternative and contesting imagi-
naries. In a time where we have seen many crises emer-
ging while many voices remain unheard, it is of  great 
importance to reclaim populism and re-enact its pro-
gressive potential, and it is even more urgent as some 
right-wing populists precisely appropriate anticolonial 
discourses.110 
References
ALSTON, P. The Populist Challenge to Human Rights. 
Journal of  Human Rights Practice, v. 9, n. 1, p. 1–15, fev. 
2017. 
ANGHIE, A. Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of  in-
ternational law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007.
ARATO, A. How We Got Here? Transition Failures, 
Their Causes and the Populist Interest in the Constitu-
tion. Philosophy & Social Criticism, v. 45, n. 9-10, p. 1106-
1115, 2019.
BENTON, L. Made in empire: Finding the history of  in-
ternational law in imperial locations: introduction. Leiden 
Journal of  International Law, v. 31, n. 3, p. 473-478, 2018. 
110 KOROLCZUK, E.; GRAFF, A. Gender as “Ebola from Brus-
sels”: the anticolonial frame and the rise of  illiberal populism. Signs: 









































































BUGARIC, B. Central Europe’s descent into autocra-
cy: a constitutional analysis of  authoritarian populism. 
International Journal of  Constitutional Law, v. 17, n. 2, p. 
597-616, jul. 2019.
BUGARIC, B. The two faces of  populism: between 
authoritarian and democratic populism. German Law 
Journal, v. 20, n. 3, p. 390-400, abr. 2019.
CHAPMAN, H. O. The Chinese Revolution 1926-27: a re-
cord of  the period under communist control as seen 
from the nationalist capital, Hankow. Edimburgo: Con-
stable & CO LTD, 1928.
CHEN, T. Analysis of  Strikes in China, from 1918 to 1926. 
London: Nabu Press, 2010.
CHEN, T. Labor Conditions in China. Monthly Labor Re-
view, v. 19, n. 5, p. 36-49, nov. 1924.
CHEN, T. Labor Unrest in China. Monthly Labor Review, 
v. 13, n. 16, 1921.
CHEN, T. The Labor Situation in China. Monthly Labor 
Review, v. 11, n. 207, 1920.
CHEN, T. The Labour Movement in China. International 
Labour Review, v. 15, n. 339, 1927.
CHIMNI, B. S. Capitalism, imperialism, and internatio-
nal law in the twenty-first century. Oregon Review of  Inter-
national Law, v. 14, n. 17, 2012. 
DE LA TORRE, C. Populism in Latin America. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017. Available in: https://
www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/ox-
fordhb/9780198803560.001 .0001/oxfordhb-
9780198803560-e-8 Accessed on: 21 Feb. 2020.
DOYLE, O. et al. Populism: a health check for consti-
tutional democracy? German Law Journal, v. 20, n. 401, 
2019.
EATWELL, R.; GOODWIN, M. National populism: the 
revolt against liberal democracy. London: Penguin UK, 
2018.
ESLAVA, L. et al. Bandung, global history, and international 
law: critical pasts and pending futures. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017. 
FANON, F. The Wretched of  the Earth. Chicago: Richard 
Philcox tr, Grove Press, 2004.
GILMAN, N. The new international economic order: 
a reintroduction. Humanity: An International Journal of  
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, v. 6, n. 
1, 2015.
GUANGDONGSHENG, et al. (ed.). Sheng Gang Da Ba-
gong Ziliao. Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Press, 1980. 
HAN, X. Chinese Discourses on the Peasant, 1900-1949. 
New York: SUNY Press, 2012.
HORROCKS, R. J. The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-
1926: Hongkong workers in an anti-imperialist move-
ment. 1994. Available in: https://core.ac.uk/downlo-
ad/pdf/1145945.pdf  Accessed on: 21 Sept. 2020.
HOSTOVSKY BRANDES, T. International law in do-
mestic courts in an era of  populism. International Journal 
of  Constitutional Law, v. 17, n. 576, 2019.
HOWSE, R. Epilogue: in defense of  disruptive demo-
cracy: a critique of  anti-populism. International Journal of  
Constitutional Law, v. 17, n. 641, 2019.
HUGHES, Charles E. et al. Conference on the Limita-
tion of  Armament. The American Journal of  International 
Law, v. 16, n. 2, p. 159-233, apr. 1922. 
ISAACS, H. The Tragedy of  the Chinese Revolution. Chica-
go: Haymarket Books, 2009.
JOUANNET, E. The liberal-welfarist law of  nations: a hi-
story of  international law. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012.
KINGSBURY, B. Sovereignty and inequality. European 
Journal of  International Law, v. 9, n. 599, 1998. 
KOO, V. K. W. Wellington Koo’s Foreign Policy: some se-
lected documents. Shanghai: Wunsz King ed, Kelly ad 
Walsh, 1931.
KOROLCZUK, E.; GRAFF, A. Gender as “Ebola 
from Brussels”: the anticolonial frame and the rise of  
illiberal populism. Signs: Journal of  Women in Culture and 
Society, v. 43, n. 797, 2018.
KRIEGER, H. Populist Governments and Internatio-
nal Law. European Journal of  International Law, v. 30, n. 
971, 2019.
KUO, H-Y. Networks beyond empires: chinese business 
and nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 
1914-1941. Leiden: BRILL, 2014.
KUO, M-S. Against Instantaneous Democracy. Interna-









































































LACLAU, E. On Populist Reason. Rio de Janeiro: Verso, 
2005.
LEE, E-H. Bei Fa Qianhou de Gemin Waijiao (1925-1931). 
Taiwan: Institute of  Modern History, Academic Sinica, 
1993.
MAO, Z. Analysis of  the Classes in Chinese Society. China: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1956. Available in: http://col-
lections.mun.ca/PDFs/radical/AnalysisoftheClassesin-
ChineseSociety.pdf  Accessed on: 5 Mar. 2020.
MCKNIGHT, D. Populism Now!: the case for progressi-
ve populism paperback. Australian: University of  New 
South Wales Press, 2018.
MOUFFE, C. For a Left Populism. Rio de Janeiro: Verso 
Books, 2018.
MUDDE, C.; KALTWASSER, C. R. Populism: a very 
short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017.
MÜLLER, J-W. What Is Populism? London: Penguin 
UK, 2017.
POSNER, E. A. Liberal Internationalism and the Popu-
list Backlash.  Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 
v. 66, 2017.
QUIGLEY, H. S. Foreign concessions in chinese hands. 1928. 
Available in: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/1928-10-01/foreign-concessions-chinese-han-
ds Accessed on: 5 Mar. 2020.
RANSOME, A. The chinese puzzle. Australian: Al-
len & Unwin, Ltd, 1927. Available in: https://
m c g i l l . wo r l d c a t . o r g / t i t l e / ch i n e s e - p u z z l e /
oclc/2754703&referer=brief_results Accessed on: 5 
Mar. 2020.
ROBERTS, A. Is International Law International? Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017.
RODILES, A. Is There a “Populist” International Law 
(in Latin America)? In: NIJMAN, J. E.; WERNER, W. 
G. (ed.). Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law 2018. 
Berlin: TMC Asser Press, 2019. v. 49.
SCHEPPELE, K. L. The opportunism of  populists 
and the defense of  constitutional liberalism.  German 
Law Journal, v. 20, n. 314, 2019.
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